World War Trump Read online

  Chapter 3, “The New Bogeymen: Russians, Immigrants, Muslims—and the Question of Impeachment,” examines the domestic political impact on the United States of both the alleged Russian cyber-tampering and the accusations of Trump complicity with Moscow on the US presidential elections. The chapter critically discusses Trump-Pence policies and the apparently growing popular sense of alienation from the American system of democratic governance. Issues include the US electoral college system; the growing gap in wealth; Trump's opposition to the Affordable Care Act (“ObamaCare”); domestic violence, terrorism, drugs, and gun control; and Trump's controversial policies toward Mexican immigration and toward immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects for Trump's impeachment.

  Chapter 4, “Risks of the New American Nationalism for the European Union,” discusses the impact of Trump's strong support for the British exit from the European Union (“Brexit”) and for nationalist movements in general. The chapter examines Trump's approach to Germany; the impact of sanctions placed on Russia in the aftermath of its annexation of Crimea in 2014; the rise of anti-EU and anti-NATO movements in France and throughout Europe after Brexit and plans for strengthening the European Union; Russian and US attempts to influence elections in Europe; and Moscow's negative reaction to EU efforts to bring former Soviet bloc states into a closer political-economic partnership with Europe.

  Chapter 5, “The Risk of War over Crimea, the Black Sea, and Eastern Europe,” examines why Trump suddenly flipped from opposing Ukraine's efforts to regain Crimea after the Russian annexation in early 2014 to supporting Kiev's efforts to regain Crimea, and why Trump no longer calls NATO “obsolete.” The chapter discusses the sociopolitical ramifications of Trump-Pence efforts to press all NATO members to boost their defense expenditures in the effort to counter Russian military pressures in the Black Sea region and in eastern Europe in general. Given the rise of the authoritarian Erdoğan regime in NATO member Turkey, plus an authoritarian leadership in Hungary, NATO has begun to lose its “democratic” credentials. While Washington has begun to fear the potential breakup of NATO due to a potential Turkish defection, Moscow has begun to fear the potential defection of Belarus from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These fears are leading both Washington and Moscow to attempt to tighten their alliance relationships against one another.

  Chapter 6, “The Global Impact of the China-Russia Eurasian Alliance,” explains how US defense and alliance policies have been pushing Russia and China into a closer alignment, not only in Eurasia but also throughout much of the world, including Mexico, Venezuela, and much of Latin America, where they intersect with the ongoing War on Drugs, thus impacting regional US and domestic interests. In analyzing the growing influence of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on Pakistan and on other states throughout the Indo-Pacific region, the chapter argues that India represents the key “pivot” state that could either move closer to a Russian-Chinese-Iranian Eurasian alliance or else toward a US-European-Japanese alliance—if New Delhi cannot remain neutral and become a potential mediator.

  Chapter 7, “China, North Korea, and the Risk of War in the Into-Pacific,” analyzes the regional implications of Chinese-Taiwanese-Japanese disputes and conflicts over the South China and East China Seas for the United States and Russia. The chapter then focuses on the real threat of nuclear war with North Korea, which could engulf the entire region—if the Trump administration does not soon engage in real negotiations involving the six powers most concerned, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, as well as North Korea.

  Chapter 8, “Syria and Widening Wars in the ‘Wider Middle East,’” critically examines Trump's decision to bomb a Syrian airfield with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles in April 2017 after the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad allegedly used poison gas against its own population. The chapter argues that Trump's strong backing for Saudi Arabia and his opposition to the Iran nuclear accord signed by the Obama administration will not only antagonize Iran but also divide the Europeans, and press Tehran closer to Russia and China—given the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia that has enveloped most of the wider Middle East and that is spreading into new regions throughout the world.

  Chapter 9, “Peace through Strength? Or World War Trump?” critically examines Trump's “America First” policies and argues that they could lead to polarization of the world into two rival alliances. To prevent the latter, the United States, along with the Europeans and Japan, must engage with both Russia and China in the effort to resolve disputes and conflicts over a number of regional hot spots. In effect, it is argued that geopolitical tensions will not be abated until the issues of Crimea, Kaliningrad, Kashmir, Taiwan, and North Korea are fully addressed by the major powers themselves through UN- or OSCE-backed Contact Group diplomacy—in a geostrategic context in which countries such as India and Turkey could play major diplomatic roles. Concurrently, the major powers need to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran into a rapprochement over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ongoing wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

  Chapter 10, “Defusing the Global Crisis,” outlines ways to reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weaponry. It argues for engaging in multilateral Contact Group diplomacy, backed by the United Nations and the OSCE, to help resolve a number of key regional disputes and conflicts. It emphasizes the need for NATO and the European Union to build effective peacekeeping forces that can work with Russia, China, and other major and regional powers under UN or OSCE mandates. In addition to arguing for implementing international legal norms to establish joint-sovereignty arrangements for territorial disputes, Chapter 10 also critiques Trump's decision to drop out of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) and argues that Trump's antediluvian emphasis on fossil fuels will amplify the global environmental crisis and exacerbate the very sociopolitical-ecological problems that could lead to wider wars—while also isolating the United States in the world community.

  And, finally, America cannot truly help to resolve many of the world's problems unless it also engages in major social and political reforms at home—by reforming the electoral college system, by better controlling and reducing spending on the federally subsidized military-industrial-congressional complex, and by engaging in new approaches to the War on Drugs, gun control, and immigration reforms. If federal, state, and local debts (roughly $23.2 trillion in 2017) continue to skyrocket, more radical constitutional reforms of the US bicameral system of democratic governance and restructuration of the fifty-state system could be considered in order to reduce costs and provide fairer and more effective national, regional, and local governance that brings American leadership much closer to the needs and interests of the population. Most crucially, and in priority, the tremendous gaps in income need to be reduced through the implementation of practical and non-ideological systems of shared capitalism and workplace democracy in different kinds of enterprises.

  World War Trump is primarily focused on reorienting American foreign and defense policy away from the pursuit of global America First hegemony and toward an omnidirectional peace-oriented diplomacy of interstate conflict resolution and inter-societal reconciliation intended to prevent a new arms race and the subsequent polarization of the world into two rival alliances. Nonetheless, the final chapter sketches a number of possible domestic US reforms that represent a practical alternative to those proposed by the Trump administration and that can hopefully be developed in greater detail in a sequel to this book. Given the depths of the global geopolitical and financial crisis now confronting the United States and the world, the point is that the prevention of major power war will also require radical reforms of the military-industrial-congressional complex, as urged by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his January 1961 farewell address. The United States will not only need to reformulate its foreign and defense policy but also radically reform its system of g
overnance and its domestic political-economy—if it is to both achieve peace abroad and work to mitigate tendencies toward even deeper social, economic, and political polarization within the United States itself.

  Even before Donald Trump's first one hundred days in office had finished, his administration was already confronted with a number of domestic and international crises. Trump's policy proposals—and efforts to implement those policies without full consultation with the parties involved—have been met with significant domestic and international political opposition.

  Trump's hastily conceived and executed foreign- and domestic-policy decrees; his often-incoherent statements, tweets, and actions with respect to Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, China, and Taiwan, and the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq; his strong criticism of President Barack Obama's nuclear accord with Iran; his attempts to impose a ban on immigration to the United States from six or seven Muslim-majority “countries of concern”; his policies toward “illegal” immigration and Mexico and Venezuela; his efforts to extend the Global War on Terrorism to Afghanistan (again); his rejection of the COP 21 United Nations Climate Change treaty on global climate change; his failure to strongly condemn the white supremacist and neo-Nazi “Unite the Right” demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia; his threats to “totally destroy” the country of North Korea in response to its nuclear weapons and missile programs; coupled with many other issues, have all generated considerable domestic and international controversy, protest, and dissent.

  TRUMP'S MAJOR POLICY FLIP-FLOPS ON RUSSIA AND CHINA

  It was not a very long time after he had become president that Trump had begun to alter many of his presidential campaign pledges, at least in respect to US foreign and security policy. Trump, who had depicted himself in simplified terms as essentially “pro-Russian” and “anti-Chinese” during the US presidential campaign, soon began to flip-flop on both positions, thus creating confusion as to what US global strategy should be toward its two major rivals.

  In August 2016, with respect to Russia, presidential candidate Donald Trump had warned that US efforts to regain Crimea on behalf of Ukraine against Russia could result in World War III.1 Yet just two weeks after he became president, the Trump-Pence administration dramatically reversed course and took a much tougher approach toward the Russian annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine. A year later, in August 2017, Trump reluctantly signed into law H.R. 3364, “Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act,” which strengthens sanctions placed on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

  Ironically, Trump's own contradictory foreign-policy proposals, plus congressional investigation into his alleged collusion and business deals with Moscow, and those of his associates, could potentially undermine his promised campaign efforts to achieve a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In addition to Trump's newfound support for Ukrainian claims to Crimea, which Moscow had rapidly annexed in 2014, other policies that could alienate Moscow include Trump's massive nuclear and conventional arms buildup, his opposition to the Iran nuclear accord, and his strong support for Saudi Arabia against Iran. And, in the long term, his push for US shale energy development, coupled with his support for the 2016 Polish-Croatian “Three Seas Initiative,” could potentially put the United States into direct rivalry with Russian energy exports to Ukraine and both eastern and western Europe.

  Each of Trump's foreign-policy flip-flops are very problematic. Contrary to Trump's frequent declarations that NATO was “obsolete,” the Trump-Pence administration soon claimed that it will strongly support NATO, although it still expected allies to spend up to 2 percent of their GDP on defense. And, contrary to Trump's statements that he was “indifferent” to the European Union (although this was dubiously the case), Trump spokespersons began to claim that they strongly supported the European Union. (See chapter 4.)

  Prior to becoming president, Trump had stated that he did not care whether or not Ukraine joined NATO. Although Trump no longer appears to propose, as he did in November 2015, that Germany and the Europeans should play the major role in defending Ukraine, he has not yet stated whether he would seek to formalize Ukrainian neutrality or else bring Kiev into NATO. Instead of seeking a formal recognition of Ukrainian neutrality, the Trump administration, in part under congressional pressure, could decide to provide even greater US military assistance to Kiev in its struggle against Russian-supported “autonomists” in eastern Ukraine, thus further antagonizing Moscow—if no diplomatic solution can soon be found. (See chapters 5 and 9.)

  Both NATO and the European Union are in dire need of major reforms. Trump's policy flip-flops and unstatesmanlike emotional outbursts are not very helpful when concrete proposals are needed to solve complex problems. Most important, as discussed in this book, Trump needs to address the key issues of the proposed enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, as they impact vital Russian security concerns. The United States and Europeans need to explore with Moscow the question as to whether alternative security systems for the Black Sea/Caucasus region and Ukraine can be implemented. And the world still needs to find ways to reduce, if not eliminate, step-by-step, nuclear weaponry where possible—in the process of de-escalating nuclear tensions with North Korea. (See chapters 3, 4, 9, and 10.)

  With respect to China, Trump had initially planned to take a very confrontational approach toward Beijing. But he suddenly backed off. Prior to becoming president, Trump had threatened to play the Taiwan independence “card” in an attempt to obtain political, military, and economic concessions from Beijing. Then, just a few weeks after becoming president, Trump suddenly engaged in an about-face in a phone call with the president of China, Xi Jinping, in early February 2017. This reversal of policy was taken after the Chinese president stated he would not agree to speak with President Trump until after Trump had publicly acknowledged the “One-China” policy.2 Trump may have also suddenly switched positions due to his realization that Beijing was needed to help quell North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. (See chapters 6 and 7.)

  OTHER POLICY FLIP-FLOPS

  Trump likewise flipped on his Syrian policy. In April 2017, in the midst of his dinner with Chinese President Xi, Trump opted for “cruise missile diplomacy” by firing 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase. This action was ostensibly taken to punish the regime of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad for the purported use of chemical weaponry against the Syrian people in the ongoing civil war. The irony is that Trump had previously opposed similar missile strikes against Syria when Obama declared that Syria had crossed the “red line” in August 2013 after Damascus had previously been accused of using chemical weaponry. While Obama had opted not to strike, Trump decided to act: For Trump, Syria had now crossed too many “red lines.” Under domestic pressure to act, Trump felt he needed to show what he believed to be strength and decisiveness. But his cruise missile diplomacy did not result in any major changes in Syrian or Russian policies in that brutal war.

  Trump has also threatened Iran if the latter does not live up to its promises not to develop a nuclear weapons capability in accord with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That accord has been strongly backed by Russia and China, as well as by US allies France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Trump's strong criticism of the JCPOA, and US and Israeli threats to engage in missile strikes against presumed Iranian nuclear sites, not only threaten to undermine Trump's promises to achieve a positive relationship with Moscow but also could alienate Iran, particularly if Trump or the US Congress eventually decides to decertify the JCPOA without clear evidence of Iranian cheating. This could then encourage Teheran and other countries in the region to develop nuclear weaponry; Saudi Arabia, for example, could look toward nuclear-capable Pakistan for assistance. And Trump's major $110 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia in May 2017, which was designed in part to counter Iran's missile testing and conventional weapons buildup, will only exacerbate Iranian-Saudi proxy wars throughout the wider Middle East, from
Syria and Iraq to Yemen and up into Afghanistan. (See chapter 8.)

  Not only that, but Trump's strong criticism of the Iranian nuclear accord could undermine the possibility that North Korea would accept a somewhat-similar future accord. The failure to press North Korea toward a nuclear freeze, and then hopefully toward denuclearization, could then lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weaponry in the Indo-Pacific—if not to a nuclear war that devastates the Korean Peninsula and much of the region. Here, Pyongyang heard the opposite message than that which Trump had intended in Syria: Pyongyang has continued to test a range of weapons systems in the aftermath of Trump's Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on the Syrian airbase—in preparation for a possible war with the United States. Likewise, in the aftermath of Trump's September 2017 speech to the United Nations, in which Trump called Kim a “Rocket Man…on a suicide mission,” Pyongyang boosted the rhetoric by threatening to detonate a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean, and by calling Trump “a mentally deranged US dotard.”3 Put crassly, Trump and Kim have entered into a radioactive pissing match with potentially lethal consequences. (See chapters 7 and 9.)

  Trump's anti-immigrant and America First protectionist stance also impacts countries closer to the US homeland and could further destabilize Mexico. In effect, given the ongoing social conflict in Venezuela, Trump-Pence policies toward Latino immigrants could impact US regional security by opening up Central America and the Caribbean to even greater Chinese and Russian political-economic influences—while exacerbating the drug wars and terrorist activities. The need for stability in the region—and for counterbalancing Chinese and Russian influence—is obtaining global attention. NATO has been considering making Venezuela's neighbor, Colombia, NATO's first Latin American partner.4 In his September 2017 UN speech, rather than urging regional diplomacy, Trump threatened the possibility of US military intervention in Venezuela ostensibly in the effort to help “them…regain their democracy.” An alternative is concerted mediation with Cuba, but Trump has downgraded US ties to Havana. (See chapters 6 and 10.)